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A New Sort of Duty?  The Significance of “Outcome” Duties in the Climate Change and 
Child Poverty Acts 
 
Colin T. Reid* 
Professor of Environmental Law, University of Dundee 
 
 
Statutory duties on Ministers and other public authorities are not new but have been 
becoming increasingly common in recent years, with a general trend towards the imposition 
of stronger obligations.  The purpose of this article is to examine the appearance of what 
appears to be a new form of duty, imposed on Ministers under the climate change legislation 
and also making an appearance in relation to child poverty.  It is argued that the main duties 
under that legislation represent an innovation in the form of an “outcome” duty, a duty not 
just to do something but to ensure the achievement of a specified outcome which depends on 
the cumulative conduct of a wide range of parties.  Such duties make new demands on public 
authorities, different from those imposed by the sorts of duties that have previously been 
used, and setting new challenges in terms of enforcement.  They are, however, not wholly 
unfamiliar, sharing features with obligations imposed on the state as a whole under some 
elements of EU law.  Closer analysis suggests that even if their innovative content is 
recognised, such duties may not be amenable to direct judicial enforcement, but this in turn 
raises questions over their nature, status and impact.   
 
For simplicity and brevity, the bulk of the analysis here concentrates on the climate 
change legislation.  The same arguments apply to the duty on the Secretary of State to ensure 
that the child poverty targets are met by 2020,1 and any significant differences are noted 
before the consequences of having different outcomes to achieve are considered at the end of 
the paper. 
 
“Outcome”  Duties 
 
  The Climate Change Act 2008 and the Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009 impose 
duties of many sorts on Ministers and other public authorities.  Most of these fall within the 
categories of duties which are familiar from other legislation,2 as can be illustrated by taking 
examples from the Scottish Act.  This is not the place for a full taxonomy of statutory duties 
imposed on public authorities, but the existing types of duty can be roughly grouped  into the 
following, sometimes overlapping, categories: 
- “operational” duties require authorities to carry out specific tasks,3 and here include the 
obligations on the Scottish Ministers to produce land use and public participation 
strategies;4 
                                                 
*  This article has grown from a paper delivered at the Public Law Adjudication conference at Edinburgh Law 
School in April 2011.  I am grateful to the comments from and conversations with participants there and to 
comments from colleagues Prof. Alan Page and Prof. Janet McLean, from Dr. Aileen McHarg at Glasgow 
University and from the anonymous reviewer that have assisted the development of this piece. 
 
1  Child Poverty Act 2010, s.2. 
2  The examples given below are drawn from environmental law, but similar examples can be found in any other 
area where statutory intervention has created a role for Ministers and public authorities, e.g. 10 of the first 15 
sections of the Communications Act 2003 (as initially enacted) concern duties. 
3  E.g. the duty on local authorities to inspect their area for contaminated land, to give notice when such land is 
found, to serve notices requiring the remediation of such sites and to maintain a register of these (Environmental 
Protection Act 1990, ss.78B, 78E and 78R). 
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- “procedural” duties set out the procedure which must be followed to achieve certain 
tasks,5 and here include the consultation requirements prior to the publication of the land 
use strategy;6 
- “relationship” duties establish the relationship between different authorities by 
requiring consultation7 or establishing a hierarchy in terms of reporting,8 guidance9 or 
directions,10 and here include the many obligations on Ministers to report to the 
Parliament and provide guidance to public bodies;11 
- “have regard” duties require authorities to have regard to certain things in the exercise 
of their functions (but not to go beyond that to give them overriding weight)12 and here 
include the obligations on Ministers to have regard to certain criteria in setting annual 
targets and on public authorities to have regard to ministerial guidance in relation to their 
climate change duties;13 
- “purposive” duties set out the general objective to be pursued in carrying out a task14 or 
by an authority as a whole15 and here include the obligation on Ministers and public 
bodies to exercise functions “in a manner which encourages equal opportunities”;16 
- “endeavour” duties17 go beyond setting out a broad purpose by requiring authorities to 
do certain things, but what is required is very broadly defined18 and often subject to 
                                                                                                                                                        
4  Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, ss.57, 91. 
5  E.g. the obligations to notify owners, occupiers (and in Scotland significant others) when an SSSI is 
designated and the consultation and notification requirements imposed on public bodies in relation to activities 
that are likely to damage the natural features of an SSSI (Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, ss.28, 28G-28I; 
Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, ss.3, 12-15, 48(2)). 
6  Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, s.57(4)-(5). 
7  E.g. consultation between local authorities and the environment agencies in relation to contaminated land 
(Environmental Protection Act 1990, s.78C). 
8 E.g. the obligations on the environmental and nature cons ervation agencies to report through Ministers to 
Parliament (Environmental Protection Act 1990, Sched.6 paras 19-21; Natural Heritage (Scotland) Act 1991, 
s.10; Environment Act 1995, s.45; Natural Environment and Countryside Act 2006, Sched.1  paras.23-25, 
Sched.4 para.18). 
9 E.g. local authorities must follow Ministerial guidance on contaminated land (Environmental Protection Act 
1990, s.78A(2)). 
10 E.g. the Environment Agency and the Scottish Environment Protection Agency (SEPA) must follow 
Ministerial directions (Environment Act 1995, s.40). 
11  Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, ss.33-43, 45. 
12  E.g. the duties on Ministers, government departments and public bodies to “have regard to the desirability” of 
conserving the natural heritage etc. (Countryside (Scotland) Act 1967, s.66; Countryside Act 1968, s.11) and the 
many obligations to have regard to sustainable development; A. Ross, “Why Legislate for Sustainable 
Development? An Examination of Sustainable Development Provisions in UK and Scottish Statutes”  (2008) 20 
JEL 35. 
13  Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, ss. 4(3)-(4), 45 
14  E.g. the purpose set out for the exercise of the pollution control powers of the Environment Agency and 
SEPA (Environment Act 1995, ss.5, 33). 
15  E.g. the general aims and purposes set out for Scottish Natural Heritage (Natural Heritage (Scotland) Act 
1991, s.1(1)). 
16  Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, s.93. 
17  Duties of this sort have previously been referred to as “exhortatory or target duties” (Kent v Griffiths [2001] 
QB 36 at 51, Woolf LJ), but the current phrase seems clearer in order to distinguish between “targets” which 
must be achieved and those which must simply be worked towards. 
18  E.g. the duty on the environment agencies to “follow developments in technology and techniques for 
preventing or minimising, or remedying or mitigating the effects or, pollution of the environment,” where no 
simple pass/fail test that can be applied to check whether there has been compliance (Environment Act 1995,  
ss.5(4), 33(4)). 
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significant qualifications,19 and here these include the obligation “so far as reasonably 
practicable” to ensure a high standard of energy performance in government buildings.20 
Such duties may demand that authorities do certain things themselves or set out broad 
objectives, but they do not require that certain outcomes are achieved.21   
 
What stands out in the climate change legislation, though, is the very different nature 
of the key duties that are imposed in relation to the targets for reducing the volume of 
greenhouse gas emissions.  These simply require Ministers to ensure that the relevant targets 
are met.22 
It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the net UK carbon 
account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the 1990 baseline.23 
The Scottish Ministers must ensure that the net Scottish emissions 
account for the year 2050 is at least 80% lower than the baseline.24 
A similar formulation appears in the Child Poverty Act 2010 in relation to the targets to 
reduce child poverty by 2020.25  These are not duties requiring the Ministers just to do 
specific acts, to develop plans for achieving the specified goals, to have regard to certain 
considerations or even to endeavour to bring something about.  Instead, on the face of it they 
are absolute obligations to ensure that a certain outcome is achieved, an outcome that lies 
beyond the scope of matters that are currently (or in any foreseeable future) completely 
within the direct control of the ministers,26 but rather requires a complex aggregation of legal, 
financial, policy and practical measures taken by government and others over a prolonged 
period.  There are none of the usual qualifications about doing only what is reasonable or 
practicable, or pursuing the goal only so far as consistent with other functio ns.  What the Acts 
appear to create is a duty to achieve the outcome – full stop.  Anything short of achieving that 
will amount to a breach of that duty.  Such legislation, embodying goals as legally binding 
targets, clearly makes a political statement, but what about its legal impact?   
 
 In attempting to answer that question, one parallel worth considering is that offered by 
EU legislation in similar terms.  It is not uncommon for EU Directives to set out what the 
Member States must achieve, requiring that Member States ensure that the specified standard 
or target be met, not just that they take reasonable steps towards it.  Environmental law is full 
of examples that the terms of the Climate Change Acts follow in requiring targets to be met 
                                                 
19 E.g. the obligation on public authorities in England and Wales to “take reasonable steps, consistent with the 
proper exercise of the authority's functions, to further the conservation and enhancement of the ... features by 
reason of which” an SSSI has been designated (Wildlife and Countryside Act 1981, s.28G). 
20  Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, s.75(1). 
21  Note that any duties must be carefully examined to identify exactly what they require.  The Green Energy 
(Definition and Promotion) Act 2009 requires the Secretary of State to amend the planning rules so as to provide 
automatic permission for certain forms of microgeneration on residential land (s.3), but the duty is just to put in 
place an enabling power, and says nothing about the actual detailed content of what will qualify for such 
permission, whilst the requirement that the Secretary of State “must consider” similar changes for non-
residential land (s.4) is similarly converted into a simple operational duty by specifying that the outcome of the 
consideration is simply a report to Parliament. 
22  Similar duties apply in relation to the interim targets for 2020: Climate Change Act 2008, s.5(1); Climate 
Change (Scotland) Act 2009, s.2.  
23  Climate Change Act 2008, s.1(1). 
24  Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, s.1(1). 
25  Child Poverty Act 2010, s.2(1): “It is the duty of the Secretary of State to ensure that the following targets are 
met in relation to the United Kingdom in relation to the target year ...” 
26  For other long-term policy goals any legal obligation may relate only to things that are wholly within 
ministerial control, e.g. the legal duty that may flow from the promise in the current Government’s coalition 
agreement, “to honour our commitment to spend 0.7% of GNI on overseas aid from 2013, and to enshrine this 
commitment in law”; The Coalition: our programme for government  (2010,Cabinet Office),  p.22. 
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by a specified date, not only in relation to greenhouse gas emissions themselves27 and the 
proportion of energy to be derived from renewable sources,28 but also in other areas such as 
the proportion of packaging that is to be recovered or recycled29 and the quantity of 
municipal biodegradable waste being disposed to landfill.30  Failure to achieve the specified 
outcome is a breach of EU law. 
 
Such duties are treated as absolute, despite the many arguments that Member States 
have tried to advance in order to avoid a finding of non-compliance.31  The view of the 
European Court of Justice was clearly stated in a case where the United Kingdom produced 
several arguments why it should not be held in breach of its obligations under the Bathing 
Water Directive despite the fact that the water quality at a number of sites did not meet the 
required standard: 
The only derogations from the obligation incumbent upon Member States to 
bring their bathing waters into conformity with the requirements of the 
directive are those provided for in Articles 4(3), 5(2) and 8, whose provisions 
are summarized above. It follows that the directive requires the Member States 
to take steps to ensure that certain results are attained, and, apart from those 
derogations, they cannot rely on particular circumstances to justify a failure to 
fulfil that obligation.32 
The obligation on the state is thus to achieve the outcome specified, unless any 
failings are covered by the derogations or exceptions expressly provided. There is 
thus a precedent for treating “outcome” duties as meaning what they say and 
requiring that the specified result be achieved.  
 
In the context of EU obligations, the approach taken by the Court of Justice 
creates a mismatch between the obligations under EU law and the domestic 
mechanisms for achieving them, since the tasks of public authorities in the UK have 
traditionally been based on powers rather than duties to achieve certain outcomes.  
One way of reconciling these has been to impose general duties on authorities to 
exercise their powers so as to secure compliance with the EU requirements.  Thus in 
relation to both nature conservation and water, authorities are required “to exercise 
their functions under [specified] enactments so as to secure compliance with the 
requirements of” the specified Directive.33  These are in one sense similar to the 
“outcome” duties being discussed since they focus on the outcome that is to be 
achieved, in this case compliance with EU requirements.  But there is a crucial 
difference.  These duties are limited in that they instruct the authorities on how they 
are to exercise their own, separately created, functions.  To the extent that non-
compliance with the requirements of the relevant Directive is the result of other 
                                                 
27  Decision No 406/2009/EC, for the UK requiring a reduction by 2020 of 16% against the baseline in 2005. 
28  Directive 2009/28/EC, art.3. 
29  Directive 94/62/EC, art.6. 
30  Directive 1999/31/EC, art.5; like to Climate Change Acts this requires a reduction measured by the  
percentage reduction from an earlier baseline figure, here set at 1995. 
31  M. Hedemann-Robinson, Enforcement of European Environmental Law: Legal Issue and Challenges  (2007, 
Routledge Cavendish) 89-104. 
32  Commission v United Kingdom (C-56/90) [1993] ECR I-4109 at para.43, considering Directive 76/160/EEC. 
33  For nature conservation, Conservation (Natural Habitats, &c.) Regulations 1994, SI 1994/2716, reg.3 and 
Conservation of Habitats and Species Regulations 2010, SI 2010/490 relating to the Habitats and Species 
Directive 92/43/EEC; for water, Water Environment and Water Services (Scotland) Act 2003, s.2(1), 2(2) and 
Water Environment (Water Framework Directive) (England and Wales) Regulations 2003, SI 2003/3242, reg.3, 
relating to the Water Framework Directive 2000/60/EC. 
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causes, then failure to achieve that outcome does not entail a failure to comply with 
the duty imposed by domestic law.34  By contrast, the duties under the Climate 
Change Acts are simply to achieve the outcome, so that any failure does amount to a 
breach of the legal duty.  On the face of it, Ministers are responsible not just for 
doing what they can to achieve the target, but simply for ensuring that it is reached. 
 
Enforcement 
 
 The question arises, though, of what does it mean to say that the Ministers are 
“responsible”?  What are the consequences of a failure to achieve the outcome set?35  
This issue has already been given some consideration in relation to other forms of 
duty,36 but the distinctive nature of the “outcome” duties raises new challenges.  
Even where duties are much narrower and are owed not to the public at large but to 
specific individuals, e.g. the homeless,37 the UK courts have been reluctant to 
recognise them as imposing absolute obligations to produce certain results and it may 
seem absurd to suggest that the Parliaments have imposed on Ministers an absolute 
duty to ensure that something over which they have far from total control will 
happen.  One response is to read the climate change duties as qualified in some ways 
rather than as bluntly requiring the achievement of the targets, thereby precluding 
any direct judicial enforcement.  Yet this can be argued to give too little weight to the 
deliberate formulation of the duties.  Different paths have to be explored, and even if 
they do lead to the same conclusion that the duties are unlikely to be amenable to 
direct enforcement through the courts, they raise further questions about the nature 
and purpose of the obligations that have been created.  The content of the duty will 
be looked at first and then other issues that would arise in trying to invoke judicial 
intervention. 
 
The Content of the Duty 
 
Whereas it is clear that specific operational and procedural duties of the kind noted 
above can be enforced by the courts, it is generally accepted that other sorts of duties are not 
necessarily amenable to direct judicial enforcement.   
“Parliament has become fond of imposing duties of a kind which, since they 
are of a general and indefinite character, are perhaps to be considered as 
political duties rather than as legal duties which a court could enforce. ... Only 
in the unlikely event of its making total default would [an authority] be at risk 
                                                 
34  Although given the breadth of ministerial powers, particularly  the little-used but potentially far-reaching 
direction and default powers in relation to other authorities and the compulsory purchase or intervention p owers 
over private enterprises, there may be arguments over whether taking a more radical view of how functions 
should be exercised might have avoided falling short of the outcome. 
35  It should be noted that there are mechanisms within the Acts to alter the targets, which might be activated to 
adjust the targets to what is being achieved in practice rather than the targets shaping what has to be done; 
Climate Change Act 2008, ss.2-3; Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, s.2.  The Scottish power does not apply 
to the 2050 target and the English one has already been exercised to raise the 2020 target; Climate Change Act 
2008 (2020 Target, Credit Limit and Definitions) Order 2009, SI 2009/1258, art.2. 
36  See generally C. Callaghan, “What is a ‘Target Duty’?” [2000] Jud Rev 184; S. Hendry, ‘‘Worth the paper 
that it’s written on? An analysis of statutory duty in modern environmental law’’ [2005] J.P.L. 1145; C.T. Reid 
and I.R. Roberts, ‘‘Nature Conservation Duties: More appearance than substance’’ (2005) 17 E.L.M. 162, 
pp.166–168; A. Ross, ‘‘Why Legislate for Sustainable Development? An Examination of Sustainable 
Development Provisions in UK and Scottish Statutes’’ (2008) 20 J.E.L. 35, pp.60–65. 
37  O’Rourke v Camden Council [1998] AC 188. 
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of legal compulsion in respect of its general duties.  But as soon as duties 
become sufficiently specific, the courts do not shrink from enforcing them.”38 
The climate change duties can be seen as political duties of the sort mentioned there, a view 
reinforced by the explicit description of the reductions as “targets”. 
“It may be said that that the duty in cl.1(1) [now s.1(1) of the Climate Change Act 
2008], while owed to no one in particular, is sufficiently specific to be enforced. 
However, although cl.1(1) does specify precisely the reduction in the carbon 
account the Secretary of State is to ensure, it is plain that this reduction is a target. 
It is called that in the marginal note, in the heading and in the preamble. A target 
is something that one aims to achieve . . . but no one can guarantee a bull’s eye. 
Inherent in the idea of a target is an aspiration not a guarantee of achievement. At 
most then this clause can be interpreted as requiring the Secretary of State to use 
his or her best endeavours to achieve the target. This has the consequence that a 
failure to achieve the target does not necessarily imply a breach of the duty.” 39 
Thus, the annotation to section 1 of the Climate Change Act 2008 on Westlaw notes that 
achieving the emissions target may depend on matters outside the Minister’s control and then 
asserts:  
“The duty therefore has to be read as a duty to take reasonable steps, in the 
exercise of the Secretary of State’s existing functions and by new kinds of action 
reasonably within what would normally be expected of a Government department, 
towards ensuring that the target is met.” 
 
Such an approach is in line with the courts’ general desire to avoid becoming 
embroiled in areas where they are asked to judge on issues which inevitably involve wide-
ranging arguments over policy preferences, the allocation of resources and the merits of 
particular action or inaction in a world of long-term uncertainty.40  Yet it can be argued that 
this does not give sufficient weight to the specific formulation of the climate change and 
child poverty duties.  In comparison with the formulations used in other statutes it is the 
precision of what is to be achieved and the very absence of words limiting the duty either to 
what it is reasonable or practicable to achieve or to the actions of the Ministers themselves 
which are most striking.  The duty is not phrased as an “endeavour” duty and it can be argued 
that this distinction should be given legal weight, especially since interpreting the duty in a 
more absolute sense may actually help the courts to avoid being faced with difficult 
“political” decisions.   
 
There are two ways in which the difference between “endeavour” and “outcome” 
duties is most noted.  The first is that for “outcome” duties there are no qualifiers as to what 
must be achieved, there is no “degree of elasticity”.41  Such elasticity can arise either because 
of what is explicitly required or because what is required is not susceptible to precise 
assessment, either in itself or because of the presence of competing requirements.  Explicit 
qualifications include where authorities are required to “take reasonable steps”42 or “such 
                                                 
38  H.W.R. Wade & C.F. Forsyth, Administrative Law (10th ed.) (2009, OUP) 498. 
39  Memorandum from Prof. Christopher Forsyth (CCB 92) to the Joint Committee on the Draft Climate Change 
Bill (2006-07, HL 170-II/HC 542-II, Ev.238). 
40  E. Palmer, “The Child Poverty Act 2010: holding government to account for promises in a recessionary 
climate?” (2010) 3 EHRLR 305, at 310-313; M. Stallworthy, “Legislating against Climate Change: A UK 
Perspective on a Sisyphean Challenge” (2009) 72 MLR 412 at 423-427. 
41  Woolf LJ in R v Inner London Education Authority, ex parte Ali  (1990) 2 Admin LR 822. 
42  Wildlife and Countryside Act 1918, s.28G; for authorities in Scotland the wording of the duty is very slightly 
different (Nature Conservation (Scotland) Act 2004, s.12). 
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steps as appear to be reasonably practicable”,43 or to act “to such extent as [they] consider 
desirable”.44  Inherent lack of precision arises when the goal that is set is not precisely 
measurable, such as the “purposive” duty of “preventing or minimising, or remedying or 
mitigating the effects of, pollution of the environment,”45 or in different contexts the duty of 
providing “sufficient” schools46 or to “maintain” a road.47  The presence of duties to pursue 
competing interests may again mean that the legislation does not exactly specify what 
outcome must be achieved, whether as a result of a body being required to strive for an 
objective only “so far as may be consistent with the proper discharge of its functions" or of a 
range of objectives being set without specifying the precise balance between them.48  
 
The second difference is that the obligation is not defined in terms of the efforts of the 
Ministers themselves, but based on the achievement of the outcome.  The most obvious 
contrast is where a broad duty has been imposed as a means of seeking to secure compliance 
with EU requirements.  EU law may impose an obligation on the state to achieve an outcome, 
but the domestic legislation has merely required Ministers and other public bodies “to 
exercise their functions under [specified] enactments so as to secure compliance with the 
requirements of” the relevant Directive.49  Such phrasing is very different and clearly more 
limited than the climate change duty to “ensure” a certain level of emissions.  The former 
affects only the way in which existing powers and functions are exercised; the latter is not so 
restricted. 
 
It is also notable that other weaker forms of obligation have been avoided.50  A 
common device is not actually to require that an outcome is achieved but to require that 
certain things are done, which may help toward that outcome.  The Climate Change 
(Scotland) Act 2009 itself contains many duties of this sort, requiring the Ministers to 
produce among other things a land use strategy, an energy efficiency plan, a plan for 
promoting renewable heat and a strategy for public engagement.51  Since the legal obligations 
are purely in relation to the production of the plan or strategy, not its content or 
implementation, the courts can make a clear determination of whether or not the duty has 
been fulfilled, without any risk of becoming entangled in any political debates over what is 
the right thing to do.   
 
Such issues were explored in R (Friends of the Earth) v Secretary of State for 
Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform52 where the Court of Appeal held that statutory 
provisions in relation to fuel poverty53 required the production of a strategy but that the 
government could not be held legally to account for failing to achieve the target set in that 
                                                 
43  Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, ss.41,42. 
44  Environment Act 1995, ss.6, 34 
45  Environment Act 1995, s.5; the same purpose is stated for SEPA, ibid., s.33. 
46  Education Act 1944, s.8, as considered in  R v Inner London Education Authority, ex parte Ali  (1990) 2 
Admin LR 822 (now Education Act 1996, s.14). 
47  Haydon v Kent County Council [1978] QB 343. 
48  Both features of the Forestry Act 1967, s.1(3A). 
49  Note 33, above. 
50  There is a contrast between duties relating to the child poverty targets for 2020, which must be achieved, and 
for 2010, which must be the subject of reports; Child Poverty Act 2010, ss.1-2.  Similarly the climate change 
legislation establishes only two targets as legally binding, for 2020 and 2050, with the other targets and budget s 
the subject of reporting duties only. 
51  Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, ss. 57, 60, 61, 91. 
52  R (Friends of the Earth) v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2009] EWCA 
Civ 810,. 
53  Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000, s.2. 
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strategy.  The obligation was rather to endeavour to meet the target and to do so “as far as 
reasonably practicable”.54  In particular, it was said that in assessing practicability regard was 
to be had to the resources available to the relevant department, rather than requiring the 
allocation of public revenues to be altered to give absolute priority to meeting the stated goal.   
 
Where the legislation identifies the steps towards an objective, a similar approach has 
been shown by the European Court of Justice.  In Janecek v Freistaat Bayern55 it was held 
that an individual resident did have the right to require city authorities to prepare an action 
plan to deal with locally poor air quality,56 but that the authorities had discretion over its 
content – it did not have to guarantee absolute compliance with the requisite standards of air 
quality, so long as it was capable of producing a return to compliance.  The “operational” 
duty was enforceable by individual residents, whereas they could not insist on the specific 
outcome from the process.  At the appropriate time, though, the EU itself could hold the state 
responsible for failing to achieve any goals that had been clearly set. 
 
Going beyond such a procedural approach would take the UK courts into territory 
where they have always felt uncomfortable, setting priorities for government action in a way 
which they have been extremely keen to avoid.57  Requiring Ministers to produce reports or 
strategies or to have regard to certain considerations in deciding what to do is one thing; 
requiring them actually to achieve certain goals is another, especially when meeting those 
goals involves much more than simply doing certain things themselves, but rather operating 
all the levers and drivers of government to co-ordinate action across society and the economy 
as a whole.  In particular, the courts have shied away from getting involved in decisions that 
affect the allocation of public resources.  Of course, almost every decision has some effect on 
resources, but in several cases, notably ones about healthcare, the courts have insisted that the 
“[d]ifficult and agonising judgment ... as to how a limited budget is best allocated ... is not a 
judgment which a court can make.”58  In the Friends of the Earth case the court accepted that 
in the face of limited public finances it would be “constitutionally startling” for the court to 
order that certain objectives be prioritised within government “bypass[ing] the long-
established constitutional processes and controls in respect of public expenditure.”59  Yet the 
climate change legislation does seem to set such a priority for government and to give it 
status as a legal duty to be fulfilled.  It is suggested in the Friends of the Earth case that 
setting priorities for government might be required by the use of “clear and unambiguous 
language”,60 and that is exactly what the simple wording of the climate change duties seems 
to provide.  There is at least an arguable case that the main duties under the climate change 
legislation thus break new ground by imposing an unqualified requirement on Ministers to 
achieve a particular outcome.61  
                                                 
54  Warm Homes and Energy Conservation Act 2000, s.2(1). 
55  Janecek v Freistaat Bayern (C-237/07) [2008] ECR-I 6221. 
56  Under Directive 96/62/EC. 
57  See, for example, the explicit disavowal by Holman J of any role for the courts in “macro -economic” and 
“macro-political” decisions in R (Luton Borough Council) v Secretary of State for Education [2011] EWHC 217 
Admin at [17], [48], [58] and [62]. 
58  R v Cambridge Health Authority, ex p B [1995] 1 W.L.R. 898 (Bingham MR at 906); see R. James and D. 
Longley, “Judicial Review and Tragic Choices: Ex p B” [1995] PL 367; J. King, “The Justiciability of Resource 
Allocation” (2007) 70 MLR 197. 
59  R (Friends of the Earth) v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2009] EWCA 
Civ 810, [2010] Env LR 11, at [46]. 
60  R (Friends of the Earth) v Secretary of State for Business, Enterprise and Regulatory Reform [2009] EWCA 
Civ 810, [2010] Env LR 11, at [46]. 
61  On the similar duty under the Child Poverty Act 2010, see E. Palmer, “The Child Poverty Act 2010: holding 
government to account for promises in a recessionary climate?” (2010) 3 EHRLR 305, esp. at 313-314. 
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Judicial Intervention 
 
 If we take the wording of this duty seriously, what then about enforcement?  Turning 
to the courts, judicial review is the only realistic route for seeking a sanction or remedy.62  
The likelihood of any individual being able to claim compensation is ruled out by the 
combination of the unlimited class to whom the duty is owed63 and the difficulty of 
attributing any loss to the failure to achieve the targets.  In invoking the courts’ intervention, 
a number of hurdles arise.  The end result may be that the courts will not be able to enforce 
the duty, but the recognition of the different qualities of “outcome” duties may still have 
further ramifications. 
 
a) Standing 
In relation to enforcing the climate change duties, and other broad statutory duties, there may 
be issues over standing.  To whom are the duties owed and what will an individual or group 
need to show to establish standing?  The considerable relaxation of this hurdle in England 
and Wales in recent decades suggests that this would not be an issue there,64 but the 
comparative dearth of Scottish case-law on title and interest to sue has made it difficult to be 
certain whether courts would seize on the potential presented by the generous approach 
shown by past discussion of the actio popularis and by cases such as Wilson v IBA65 or (more 
likely) favour the much narrower view suggested in cases such as the recent decisions of 
Forbes v Aberdeenshire Council66 and McGinty v Scottish Ministers.67  For environmental 
cases, the Aarhus Convention68 could be argued as a lever for forcing a more open approach 
to the issue of standing.69  Now, though, the Supreme Court in AXA General Insurance Ltd v 
HM Advocate70 has given a very clear indication that a broad approach should be adopted in 
the public law context, based on the party being “directly affected”71 or having  “sufficient 
interest”72 rather than having legal title.  It remains to be seen, though, how this shift in 
approach will operate in practice. 
 
b) Express Exclusion 
The courts can be prevented from considering certain cases by express provisions excluding 
their jurisdiction.  The fact that no such exclusion is provided in the UK or Scottish climate 
change legislation nor in the Child Poverty Act 2010 could be an indication that the courts are 
intended to have a role.  Where judicial intervention is not wanted, it is easy enough for 
Parliament to say so, e.g. the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010 stated that the reporting 
                                                 
62  Further options, such as “contempt of statute” are discussed but dismissed in P. McMaster, “Climate Change 
– statutory duty or pious hope?” (2008) 20 JEL 115. 
63  Even where a specific class can be argued as the beneficiaries the courts have been reluctant to recognise 
statutory duties as creating rights to compensation: Calveley v Chief Constable of Merseyside [1989] A.C. 1228; 
O’Rourke v Camden Council [1998] AC 188. 
64  Memorandum from Prof. Christopher Forsyth (CCB 92) to the Joint Committee on the Draft Climate Change 
Bill (2006-07, HL 170-II/HC 542-II, Ev.238). 
65  Wilson v IBA 1979 SC 351. 
66  Forbes v Aberdeenshire Council [2010] CSOH 1, [2010] Env. L.R. 36. 
67 McGinty v Scottish Ministers [2011] CSOH 163. 
68  Convention on Access to Information, Public Participation in Decision -Making and Access to Justice in 
Environmental Matters (1998), art.9. 
69  As proposed in the Report of the Civil Courts Review (chaired by Lord Gill) (2009) vol.2 pp.28-29. 
70  AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, 2011 SLT 1061. 
71  AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, 2011 SLT 1061, Lord Hope at [63]. 
72  AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, 2011 SLT 1061, Lord Reed at [171]. 
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procedures provided in the Act were “[t]he only means of securing accountability in relation 
to” the duties imposed and that non-compliance with the duties did not affect the lawfulness 
of anything done or not done. 73  In similar vein, the Irish Climate Change Response Bill that 
fell when the election there was called in January 2011 provided that the targets and duties it 
set out “shall not be justiciable”.74  The absence of such an express exclusion could certainly 
be taken as indicating that there is intended to be a role for the courts. 
 
c) Alternative Remedy 
It is not only where they are expressly excluded that the courts will refuse to entertain a case 
since certain other more general rules75 also operate to prevent judicial review being sought.  
The most likely candidate is perhaps the one preventing access to the courts for judicial 
review when an alternative remedy is available.76  The climate change legislation does 
provide detailed requirements to report to Parliament and these are undoubtedly seen as the 
primary mechanism for enforcement.77  Yet it is unclear whether these would be regarded as 
offering a remedy sufficient to displace the standard right to seek judicial redress, especially 
in view of the emphasis that Ministers are being subjected to legal duties.  Again, the contrast 
with the explicit provisions in the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010 might be noted.  In Re 
Neill’s Application for Judicial Review78 it was held that the fact that the failure to undertake 
an equality impact assessment could lead to action by the Equality Commission for Northern 
Ireland was sufficient to exclude legal recourse, but in that case the Commission procedure 
was expressly created for the enforcement of that specific duty and there was a very clear 
contrast with adjacent provisions conferring access to the courts to seek damages or an 
injunction.  The reporting procedures in the climate change legislation are clearly designed as 
the main means of ensuring that the emission reduction targets are met, but it is uncertain 
whether the courts will view these as the exclusive means. 
 
d) Timing of action. 
A further complication arises in relation to the timing of any reference to the courts.  The 
outcomes set in the climate change legislation are to be achieved at particular dates.  
Therefore any breach of the duty can only formally arise when those dates are reached, even 
though it may be obvious in advance that what is being done is extremely unlikely to secure 
the required result.79  Any action brought prior to those dates might be viewed as premature, 
so long as there remains any possibility of the result being achieved.80   
 
 There may also be an issue not of prematurity but of lateness.  The fact that the 
emissions targets have been missed will not be immediately apparent but will need to be 
confirmed through the gathering of the many sources of data that combine to enable to 
                                                 
73  Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010, s.4; the Act has been repealed by the Budget Responsibility and National 
Audit Act 2010.  
74  Climate Change Response Bill 2010 (No.60 of 2010), s.3(2). 
75  There may be a difference between England and Wales and Scotland on whether these are appropriately 
termed as “rules” or are just aspects of the discretion enjoyed by the courts in handling judicial review cases; 
Eba v Advocate General for Scotland  [2011] UKSC 29, 2011 SLT 768 at [27] (Lord Hope). 
76  E.g. Falconer v South Ayrshire Council 2002 SLT 1033. 
77  The same applies to the Child Poverty Act 2010. 
78  [2006] NI 278, considering Northern Ireland Act 1998, ss.75, 76 and Sched.9. 
79  Again the analogy with Member States’ duties under EU law may be instructive, where in relation to giving 
effect to Directives, the duty is to implement the Directive by the due date, and at any time before that it is 
formally impossible to rule out compliance at the last minute, however unrealistic this may be known to be in 
view of policy or institutional factors within the state concerned. 
80  “The courts are neither a debating club nor an advisory chamber” Macnaughton v Macnaughton’s Trustees 
1953 SC 387 at 392 (Lord Justice Clerk Thomson). 
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creation of the net carbon account.81  After the due date has passed, would enforcing the 
duties have any meaning?82  The specific wording of the climate change duties which give 
rise to the argument that these are clear “outcome” duties militates against the argument that 
they are imposing continuing obligations.  Any legal action after that stage could be regarded 
as futile and thus not be entertained by the courts.83  In contrast, the Child Poverty Act 2010 
expressly provides for the continuing effect of the targets after the specified year has 
passed.84 
 
e)  Justiciability 
The label “justiciability” can be given to a rather slippery concept that is basically used to 
mark out a self-imposed “no-go area” for the courts covering a range of separate 
considerations that may lead to a court refusing to take a decision on an issue presented to it.  
Each of these must be considered as a potential hurdle at which an attempt to enforce the 
climate change duties might fall.   The first relates to the categories of governmental activity 
which the courts are prepared to consider.  Although the trend in recent decades has been 
very firmly away from the earlier approach of recognising certain broad categories, e.g. those 
based on the prerogative, as being wholly outwith the scope of the courts’ attention,85 there 
are undoubtedly some matters that remain unreviewable.86  For the climate change and child 
poverty duties, although they may be viewed as embracing an area of high-level government 
policy, it is hard to see them as falling within the shrinking area of activity automatically 
removed from the courts’ consideration.   
 
A second consideration relates to the issues already touched on in relation to the 
content of the duty.  The courts are reluctant to get drawn into the determination of policy 
preferences and arguments over the appropriate allocation of resources.  Yet as has been 
noted, the climate change legislation is different from previous instances by apparently 
setting a clear and overriding objective for government. The phrasing of an “outcome” duty 
means that among the various competing claims on government, a legislative formulation has 
been adopted that marks out one87 as an outcome that must be achieved, not just a goal 
towards which endeavours should be directed or consideration be had.  The issues which 
might be seen as more properly the sphere of political rather than judicial accountability88 
have thus already been determined and invoking the courts’ power would therefore be simply 
a natural consequence of the political decision to embed the greenhouse gas reductions as an 
absolute legal priority. 
 
                                                 
81  Climate Change Act 2008, s.27; Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, s.17. 
82  This is apart from any argument of when “the clock starts ticking” for legal action not to be defeated by the 
rules on delay, statutory in England and Wales and resting on the doctrine of mora  in Scotland; R (Burkett) v 
Hammersmith and Fulham LBC [2002] UKHL 23; [2002] 1 WLR 1593. 
83  Cf. Marco's Leisure Ltd v West Lothian District Licensing Board 1994 S.L.T. 129, in relation to a licence 
application for an event scheduled two months before the court hearing took place. 
84  Child Poverty Act 2010, s.17 and Sched.2. 
85  Council of Civil Service Unions v Minister for the Civil Service [1985] AC 374. 
86  E.g. the award of honours; Kerr of Ardgowan v Lord Lyon King of Arms [2009] CSIH 61, 2010 SC 1.  
87  See below for discussion of where legislation has created more than one such overriding objective, as is the 
case with the climate change and child poverty targets. 
88  See, for example the criticisms of the role taken by India’s Supreme Court in the evolution of policy; L. 
Rajamani, “Public Interest Litigation in India: Exploring Issues of Access, Participation, Equity, Effectiveness 
and Sustainability” (2007) 19 JEL 293 at 216-319. 
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Thirdly there are issues of the level of scrutiny to be applied.  As the Supreme Court 
has recently confirmed in the Cart and Eba litigation in relation to the Upper Tribunal89 and 
the AXA Insurance case in relation to the Scottish Parliament,90 not all cases of judicial 
review involve the same intensity of scrutiny.  Here, however, the formulation of an  
“outcome” duty again simplifies things.  The question that the courts have to answer is 
essentially a pass/fail one – has the outcome been achieved, an outcome that is something that 
is clearly measurable, rather than involving vaguer expressions, such as the provision of 
“sufficient” schools?91  The straightforward nature of the question to be answered is 
enhanced by the reporting obligations on Ministers and the Climate Change Committee.  
These reports will reveal authoritatively whether or not the outcome has been achieved,92 and 
unless these are themselves challenged, the courts will be relieved of the task of assessing 
factual compliance. 
 
f)  Remedies 
The final issue in considering judicial enforcement is that of remedies.  Here there are two 
issues, the competence of certain remedies and whether they would be granted even if 
competent.  Starting with the second issue, the English courts have always stressed the 
discretionary nature of any remedies in judicial review proceedings.  Moreover in the specific 
area of statutory duties it has been said that: “the remedies in public law are discretionary 
remedies and would not normally be granted if an authority is doing all that it sensibly can to 
meet an unqualified statutory obligation.”93  In Scotland the courts have been less clear about 
the extent of discretion that they enjoy, but clearly are not bound to grant a remedy as of 
right.94   
 
The courts’ decision might be affected by the remedy being sought.  If declaratory 
relief is all that is at stake, then the court simply repeating the finding of compliance or non-
compliance with the emissions reduction or child poverty target, a finding that is already 
obvious and in the public domain as a result of the various reporting procedures, is unlike ly 
to be controversial.  If other “outcome” duties were introduced without such an authoritative 
monitoring and assessment mechanism, the reluctance on the courts to intervene might well 
be all the greater.  If a more concrete remedy is sought, then in addition to the competence 
issues discussed below, further difficulties will emerge.  As discussed above, what makes an 
“outcome” duty different and more amenable to judicial enforcement than many other 
statutory duties is its absolute nature – a simple pass/fail test can be applied rather than 
embarking on balancing competing priorities for governmental intervention and resource 
                                                 
89  R (Cart) v Upper Tribunal [2011] UKSC 28, [2011] 3 WLR 107;  Eba v Advocate General for Scotland  
[2011] UKSC 29, 2011 SLT 768. 
90  AXA General Insurance Ltd v HM Advocate [2011] UKSC 46, 2011 SLT 1061. 
91  Note 46, above. 
92  Climate Change Act 2008, ss.20, 36; Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, ss.28, 40,41.  The Child Poverty 
Commission does not have such a direct role in reporting; Child Poverty Act 2010, ss.10, 14. 
93  R v Secretary of State for Education, ex parte Lee (1987) 54 P&CR 311 at 324 (Mann J). See also Scarman 
LJ in R v Bristol Corporation [1974] 1 W.L.R. 498 at 503: “In my judgment, if, in a situation such as this, there 
is evidence that a local authority is doing all that it honestly and honourably can to meet  the statutory obligation, 
and that its failure, if there be failure, to meet that obligation arises really out of circumstances over which it has 
no control, then I would think it would be improper for the court to make an order of mandamus compelling it to 
do that which either it cannot do or which it can only do at the expense of other persons not before the court who 
may have equal rights with the applicant and some of whom would certainly have equal moral claims.”  
94  E.g., King v East Ayrshire Council 1998 SLT 1287 at 1295; Ingle v Ingle’s Trustee  1999 SLT 650 at 654; 
Fargie, Petitioner [2008] CSOH 117, 2008 SLT 949 at 963. 
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allocation.95  Yet in proposing a remedy, that is exactly what may be called for.  Unless the 
court is simply going to order achievement of the outcome, merely repeating the statute, some 
consideration is going to have to be given to the specific steps that must be undertaken to 
achieve it, embroiling the courts in the very sort of issue that they have traditionally avoided. 
 
 In terms of competence it is significant on whom the duties are imposed.  In relation 
to any “outcome” duty placed on a local or statutory authority, no major obstacle arises, but 
in the Climate Change Acts the duties are imposed on “the Secretary of State” and “the 
Scottish Ministers”.   For declaratory relief there is no difficulty, but these formulations bring 
into play the arguments over the powers of the courts to grant remedies ordering ministers to 
do particular things.  In England and Wales, since M v Home Office96it has been clear that in 
some circumstances at least orders can be made against Ministers.  In Scotland the issue has 
been raised in several significant cases,97 but the unpredictable course of litigation meant that 
the expected occasion for this to be at the centre of argument never materialised98 and there 
remain uncertainties.  
 
 The points discussed in this section reveal something of a paradox.  The unqualified 
nature of the duty neutralises the factors militating against judicial intervention but at the 
same time they may leave the court with little scope to provide a meaningful remedy in the 
event of impending or actual non-compliance.  The formulation of the duty may render the 
issue justiciable, by removing the discretion and room for manoeuvre that other types of duty 
leave for Ministers, but may also constrain the ability of the courts to offer more by way of 
sanction than a self-evident declaration of non-compliance.  The question then arises of 
whether the climate change duties or other “outcome” duties mean anything more than the 
“purposive” or “endeavour” duties with which we are familiar. 
 
Nature of the Duty 
 
 As Rubin noted, most legislation nowadays is not laying down “a set of rules for the 
governance of human conduct” but provides “directives issued by the legislature to 
government- implementation mechanisms.”99  The climate change duties are directed at 
government, not the public, so that their impact should be considered not just in the light of 
the potential for direct implementation and enforcement in the same way as for private law 
duties and for the “operational” or “procedural” duties mentioned above.  Instead the effect of 
these and any future “outcome” duties must be looked for elsewhere.100 
 
By placing targets in legal form a number of practical things are achieved.  In 
comparison to simple statements of policy, the choice of legislative form allowed for a more 
formal, longer, and more transparent process for adopting the targets, involving deeper 
scrutiny.  In the case of the 2008 Act this included consideration of a draft Bill by a Joint 
                                                 
95  Cf. Gov't of the Republic of South  Africa v Grootboom  2001 (1) SA 46 (CC); A. Sachs, “Enforcement of 
Social and Economic Rights”  (2006-2007) 22 Am. U. Int'l L. Rev. 673.  
96 [1994] 1 AC 377. 
97  McDonald v Secretary of State for Scotland (No.1)  1994 S.C. 234; Davidson v Scottish Ministers [2005] 
UKHL 74, 2006 SC(HL) 41; Beggs v Scottish Ministers [2007] UKHL 3, 2007 SLT 235; C. Boyd, “Ministers 
and the Law” 2006 JR 179.  
98  Davidson v Scottish Ministers [2005] UKHL 74, 2006 SC(HL) 41, at [103] (Lord Mance); Beggs v Scottish 
Ministers [2007] UKHL 3, 2007 SLT 235, at [30] (Lord Rodger). 
99  Rubin, “Law and Legislation in the Administrative State” (1989) 89 Colum L Rev 369, 371-372. 
100  Rubin (note 99, above); L. Mader, “Evaluating the Effects: A Contribution to the Quality of Legislation” 
(2001) 22 Stat LR 119 at 122. 
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Committee at Westminster, which produced a substantive report of over 80 pages after 
reflecting on over 420 pages of evidence.101  The passage of the Climate Change Bills with 
cross-party support in each Parliament has allowed a sense of wider “ownership” than is the 
case with any statement made by the Government of the day.  The statutory status of the 
targets also achieves other things, with the legal recognition ensuring that concern for 
reaching the targets is a relevant consideration in the exercise of functions across government 
and carries extra weight in the internal arguments for resources.102   
 
There is also the symbolic nature of the legislative step.  A lot of legislation is enacted 
not so much for its direct legal impact as for “the message it sends”.  This is noticeable in 
many areas, for example the many new non-regulatory criminal offences created in the past 
decades which do not genuinely render unlawful for the first time conduct that was 
previously perfectly lawful, but rather create a new label for offending behaviour in order to 
highlight its nature.103  The use of symbolic legislation can be criticised for creating 
unnecessary laws,104 for being deceptive105 or as requiring the law to be applied and 
interpreted in a special way,106 but there undoubtedly remains an attraction for governments 
who see the real importance of such legislation as lying in the visibility given to an issue, 
rather than any formal sanctions, as the crucial means of influencing behaviour.107   
 
Such consequences, though, are largely shared with “purposive” and “endeavour” 
duties,108 so that what is different is the weight that an “outcome” duty may carry.  As well as 
the obvious point that requiring the achievement of an objective sends a stronger message to 
the public than merely presenting it as something that some steps should be taken towards, 
there are two aspects to be considered.  The first is the extent to which the form of an 
“outcome” duty enhances the status of the objective across government, as an overriding 
priority, not just a desirable goal.  The ambition for far-reaching change was stated by Lord 
Rooker in the House of Lords during the passage of the Climate Change Act 2008: “Putting a 
duty such as this into law is important in itself.  It is not just about the punishment in the 
event of failure; it is about trying to change institutional behaviour through a change in the 
law.”109   
 
                                                 
101 Joint Committee on the Draft Climate Change Bill - First Report (2006-07 HL 170-I/HC 542-I). 
102  T. Daintith & A. Page, The Executive in the Constitution: Structure, Autonomy, and Internal Control 
(Oxford, OUP, 1999), pp.199-206. 
103  E.g. “vandalism” (introduced by Criminal Justice (Scotland) Act 1980) that covered conduct already 
criminal as malicious mischief, and all the aggravated assaults that merely add more refined labels to what  was 
already covered by the general offences. 
104  See the debates over the Offensive Behaviour at Football and Threatening Communications (Scotland) Bill 
introduced to the Scottish Parliament in June 2011 (SP Bill 1). 
105  A. Siehr, “Symbolic Legislation and the Need for Legislative Jurisprudence: The Example of the Federal 
Republic of Germany” (2008) 2 Legisprudence 271. 
106 J.P. Dwyer, “The Pathology of Symbolic Legislation” (1990) 17 Ecology LQ 233.  Note though that from 
this distance the climate change and child poverty targets are achievable (albeit perhaps with great difficulty) 
whereas the symbolic legislation discussed by Dwyer required something that was in practical terms always 
unrealistic. 
107  A more cynical view notes the additional political value in demonstrating  that “something is being done” by 
the government about a problem of public concern.   
108  See note 36, above. 
109 HL Hansard vol.696 col.1209, 12 November, 2007. 
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The role of legislation in achieving such a pervasive change of attitude and behaviour 
has been subject to considerable scrutiny in the context of sustainable development.110  The 
mismatch has been noted between the limited progress towards more sustainable ways of 
living and the strong policy commitments to sustainable development made since the Rio 
Summit in 1992: “The United Kingdom is determined to make sustainable development the 
touchstone of its policies.”111  Different approaches have been considered, including what are 
described here as “operational”,  “relationship”,112 “purposive” and “endeavour” duties, with 
authors concluding that there is a real value in embedding concerns in legislation rather than 
mere policy, but also that it must be given clear priority as an objective of government, as 
well as being supported by appropriate monitoring and reporting mechanisms.113  An 
“outcome” duty may not be appropriate for a multi- faceted goal such as sustainability where 
no simple pass/fail test can be applied, but where such a goal can be identified, as for 
greenhouse gas emissions or for anti-poverty measures based on the number of households in 
specific income groups,114 there is potential to establish a dominant priority across 
government. 
 
There is a danger, though, that competing priorities appear.  Already there are binding 
targets for both climate change and child poverty but it is unclear how meeting either of these 
should rank against other duties.  So much discretion is conferred on how the climate and 
poverty targets are to be reached that in most circumstances it should be possible to reconcile 
the conflicting demands on Ministers and others, but if there is a clash, then an “outcome” 
duty surely should have precedence over duties expressed in weaker terms, e.g. the duty to 
“have regard, so far as consistent with the proper exercise of [its] functions to the purpose of 
conserving biodiversity”.115  Nevertheless there may be clashes between “outcome” duties 
themselves and between these and other strong duties, e.g. to ensure compliance with EU law 
and the European Convention on Human Rights.  In such cases, a hierarchy may have to be 
established, based perhaps on views that the “constitutional” statutes take priority over 
others,116 and between the different “outcome” duties perhaps reverting to traditional reliance 
on chronology and implied repeal, so that an earlier duty is read as being qualified by the 
greater priority given to a later one.  Alternatively, the problem of conflicts between 
supposedly absolute duties could be viewed as a further argument for not taking “outcome” 
duties at face value and interpreting them as requiring merely reasonable endeavours towards 
their achievement.  
 
The issue of hierarchy leads on to the second aspect to be considered, the extent to 
which the use of an “outcome” duty is an attempt to entrench the policy objective and to 
secure its priority so as to bind future governments.  Again this is an issue explored in 
relation to sustainable development.  Although even embedding the emissions targets in 
                                                 
110  V. Jenkins, “Placing Sustainable Development at the Heart of Government: the role of law in the evolution 
of sustainable development as the central organising principle of government” (2002) 22 Leg.St. 578; S. 
Cussons, Reviewing Statutory Sustainable Development Duties (2006, IHPC, London); A. Ross, “Why Legislate 
for Sustainable Development?” (2008) 20 JEL 35; A. Ross, Sustainable Development Law in the UK – from 
Rhetoric to Reality? (Earthscan, 2011). 
111 Introduction by Rt. Hon. John Gummer, Secretary of State for the Environment, to Sustainable Development: 
The UK Strategy (Cm 2426, 1994), p.5. 
112  In the context of establishing the status of plans and strategies. 
113  A. Ross, Sustainable Development Law in the UK – from Rhetoric to Reality? (Earthscan, 2011), chaps 13 
and 14. 
114  As in the targets in the Child Poverty Act 2010. 
115  Natural Environment and Rural Communities Act 2006, s.40(1). 
116  Thoburn v Sunderland City Council [2002] EWHC 195 (Admin), [2003] Q.B. 151. 
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statute does not mean that they are completely guaranteed as enduring commitments – 
parliamentary sovereignty, after all, means that the Acts could be amended or repealed, quite 
apart from the limited flexibility expressly provided for117 - as provisions in primary 
legislation they are clearly harder to change than mere policy commitments.  The simple 
effort and formality involved in changing the law, as opposed to policy, will make any 
departure from the targets a much less inviting task for future governments, quite apart from 
the impact of the public debate that accompanies the legislative process and will highlight the 
abandonment of the previous targets.118  The absence of qualifying words or competing 
interests to pursue also protects the priority of the objective from being legitimately eroded 
by other concerns as time passes and circumstances change. 
 
At its extreme, this has led to claims that the Climate Change Act has “constitutional 
significance”.119  This claim is examined by McHarg,120 who concludes that “as a pre-
commitment strategy designed to promote the long-term public interest ... by constraining 
short-term political and economic imperatives, the [Climate Change Act 2008] can 
reasonably be described as a constitutional measure.”121  Yet she also notes that, apart from 
questions over the appropriateness of this specific response to the climate change problem, 
there is an argument that the attempt to bind future generations is undemocratic.  Climate 
change may be a unique challenge, where the intra-generational dimension is exceptionally 
strong,122 but the question of the legitimacy of pre-commitment is an issue for any “outcome” 
duty that aims beyond the immediate future. 
 
In considering what other goals might be viewed as appropriate for the use of 
“outcome” duties, it is interesting to note different approaches in the measures taken by the 
current and previous governments in relation to other long-term undertakings, agreed (if not 
in full detail) across the political parties as goals that governments need to achieve.  As has 
been noted, in relation to reducing child poverty, an “outcome” duty in relation to the 2020 
target was enacted in the Child Poverty Act 2010 and remains in place,123 but accompanied 
by a lesser reporting duty in relation to 2010 and subsequent years.124  In relation to the 
reduction of public sector borrowing, the Labour government again chose a legislative 
approach by means of the Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010, at the heart of which lies a series of 
“outcome” duties, setting targets to be achieved by certain dates.  For example: 
                                                 
117  Climate Change Act 2008, s.2; Climate Change (Scotland) Act 2009, s.2.  This flexibility has already been 
used to raise the interim target in the 2008 Act;  Climate Change Act 2008 (2020 Target, Credit Limit and 
Definitions) Order 2009, SI 2009/1258.  There is no explicit power to alter the targets in the Child Poverty Act 
2010, but the power to define some of the crucial terms used in assessing the position (s.7) could have the effect 
of altering what must be achieved. 
118  Although this could work the other way; as meeting the targets becomes more demanding, it may be harder 
for a government to resist in Parliament a  populist call for amending the statute that sets the targets than would 
be the case if the targets were less exposed through being part of a complex mesh of environmental and social 
policies that the government was committed to support. 
119  Lord Rooker in the House of Lords during the passage of the Bill; HL Deb vol.696 col.1209 (27 Nov. 2007). 
120  A. McHarg, “Climate Change Constitutionalism? Lessons from the United Kingdom” (2011) 2 Climate Law 
1. 
121  McHarg (note 120, above),  p.15. 
122  R.J. Lazarus, “Super Wicked Problems and Climate Change: Restraining the Present to Liberate the 
Future”(2008-09) 94 Cornell L Rev 1154. 
123  Child Poverty Act 2010, s.2. 
124  Child Poverty Act 2010, s.1.  Like the Climate Change Acts this Act creates a reporting and advisory body, 
the Child Poverty Commission, and imposes strict requirements to report to Parliament on progress towards t he 
targets.  
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The Treasury must ensure that, for the financial year ending in 2014, public 
sector net borrowing expressed as a percentage of gross domestic product is 
no more than half of what it was for the financial year ending in 2010.  125 
In this Act judicial enforcement was expressly precluded, 126 but the use of the “outcome” 
duties was notable.   
 
Since then, though, the new coalition government has reverted to a more traditional 
approach, repealing the 2010 Act and replacing it with the Budget Responsibility and 
National Audit Act 2011.  This avoids creating legal targets, but establishes a Charter for 
Budget Responsibility to be overseen by the Office for Budget Responsibility.  Like the 
Committee on Climate Change established under the climate change legislation, this Office 
has to produce reports to Parliament as the main way of ensuring progress toward the stated 
goals, but the goals themselves are not given direct legal status.  The volatility of government 
finances in a very uncertain international economic context and the centrality of finance to 
everything that a government does, and hence the desire for greater room to manoeuvre, may 
by themselves distinguish this situation from climate change.  Or perhaps the view has been 
taken to eschew legally binding targets so that the climate change and child poverty duties 
will remain as the sole examples of a new sort of statutory duty, short-lived as a legislative 
technique but with an impact enduring until 2050 at least.127 
 
Conclusion 
 
This paper has presented an argument that the Climate Change and Child Poverty 
Acts can be taken at face value as creating a new form of statutory duty, representing a legal 
innovation through the imposition of unqualified legal duties on Ministers to achieve certain 
outcomes which can be met only as the result of a complex aggregation of legislation, 
decisions, actions and public spending over an extended period.  If the phrasing of these 
duties is to be taken seriously and their legal status is to be substantial rather than symbolic, 
then one might expect that they should be amenable to some form of enforcement through the 
courts.  Although the very features that suggest that the Acts do create specific legal duties 
that can be enforced also serve to strip away some of the arguments used to avoid the courts’ 
judging government on its policy choices (as opposed to how it is doing things), other hurdles 
may stand in the way of effective judicial intervention.128  Nevertheless the statutory status of 
the emissions targets has consequences in practical politics and in law, consequences 
enhanced by the use of “outcome” duties as opposed to the formulations we are more 
accustomed to.  The potential for such duties in relation to less clearly measurable outcomes 
may be questioned, as may the legitimacy of the use of such duties to pre-determine policy 
for future generations.  Accordingly, the Climate Change Acts may survive as a one-off 
response to a problem that is exceptional in its scale and time-frame, with child poverty as the 
only other area where the technique is used.  Nevertheless, the use of “outcome” duties does 
create a precedent, albeit one whose meaning is not wholly clear and that raises a number of 
issues demanding more thorough examination before the precedent is more widely used. 
                                                 
125  Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010, s.1(2). 
126  Fiscal Responsibility Act 2010, s.4. 
127  It is worth remembering that by the time the main emission targets have to be met in 2050, forty years away, 
the relationship between the courts and government may be very different from what it is today  - forty years ago 
we had not even reached Laker Airways, far less GCHQ, in terms of the reviewability of powers under the 
prerogative; Laker Airways Ltd. v Department of Trade [1977] Q.B. 643; Council of Civil Service Unions v 
Minister for the Civil Service [1985] A.C. 374. 
128 Nonetheless, given the uncertainty over the impact of the legal duties, the best practical advice may be to try 
to avoid being the relevant Minister at the key dates.   
